For 78 long days, NATO relentlessly dropped bombs and missiles on a small "sovereign" nation of 11 million. After undertaking over 40,000 sorties, the world’s strongest military alliance stands accused of killing more than 1,500 civilians (the Yugoslav government places this figure at "more than 2000" while the Human Rights Watch claims "500 civilian fatalities" of NATO bombing; the press has been using the figure of "more than 1,500"), wounding several thousands and imperiling the immediate and long-term public health of the region by poisoning the environment. NATO also destroyed close to 100 billion dollars worth of property, including by and large the civilian infrastructure, industry and housing. Triggered by the bombing, the intensified Yugoslav counterinsurgency actions led to the flight of more than 800,000 Kosovo Albanians (this figure is also disputed, but this has been the most widely quoted number). Many of these people also fled NATO bombs, which is evident by their refuge not only in Albania and Macedonia but also in the rest of FR Yugoslavia. In addition, the Yugoslav forces appear to have killed several thousand Albanians (predictions vary concerning the total number of the victims, ranging from 2,500 to 10,000, with higher numbers provided by NATO) during the bombing, although the extent of the actual war crimes has not been verified yet. While NATO succeeded in forcing the Yugoslav troops out of Kosovo and returning the created Albanian refugees home, it failed in its original mission of ensuring a democratic and multiethnic Kosovo. Since last June when the bombing was halted, most of the non-Albanian Kosovo minorities (Serbs, Roma, Gorani, Turks) fled the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), receiving little protection from NATO-led peacekeepers (KFOR). Indeed, many that remained were murdered, their houses were burnt and over eighty churches and monasteries have been destroyed. Kosovo has yet to see peace.

NATO countries refused to call their bombing action a war. Cynics would argue that this is because the Yugoslav military and police were left almost unscathed. The idealists would consider such use of ambiguous terms as a road to the creation of a new legal rule supporting a humanitarian intervention to stop massive violations of human rights. The following analysis questions both the legality and the morality of the Kosovo intervention, attempting to draw lessons concerning any precedent setting effect and the development of new international law.

The NATO intervention is a blatant violation of international law. Even the NATO countries have not made any significant attempts to provide a legal justification for their bombing of FR Yugoslavia. In fact, the British House of Commons has officially admitted to the illegality of NATO bombing of FR Yugoslavia, though justifying the action on moral grounds (Foreign Affairs Select Committee Report, 23 May 2000).

The modern international law, based on the Westphalian principles of sovereignty of states, is embodied in the most important source of public international law – the UN Charter, which guarantees the territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of their borders (particularly Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, also supported by "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention into the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty" and other legal documents). The UN Charter permits military interventions in the domestic affairs of other countries exclusively in the case of self-defense (Article 51) and when authorized by the Security Council, assessing the crisis as a threat to international peace and security (Chapters VII, VIII). Neither one of the two requirements was satisfied by NATO even though the Security Council had been very involved in the Kosovo crisis.

The Security Council adopted three resolutions (UNSCRs 1160, 1199, and 1203) under Chapter VII of the Charter prior to the NATO bombing campaign. It authorized the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) observers, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), and called upon the FR Yugoslavia (FRY), KLA, and all other states and organizations to stop the use of force and halt human rights violations. The territorial integrity of FRY was consistently reaffirmed. Indeed, following the bombing, the Security Council adopted a resolution (UNSCR 1244) that did not retroactively legalize NATO actions but only prospectively authorized foreign states to intervene in the FRY to maintain peace, with Kosovo remaining a part of Yugoslavia.

In bypassing UN approval for the current bombing, the NATO countries also violated their own North Atlantic Treaty. The NATO Charter pledged its signatories to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and it explicitly recognized "the primary responsibility of the Security Council (of the United Nations) for the maintenance of international peace and security." In addition, the NATO Charter specifically requires force to be used only when a member of NATO is attacked. Jamie Shea, the NATO spokesperson, claims that NATO has not violated the latter provision because the treaty does not explicitly forbid NATO members to act as an offensive alliance. Such argumentation is legally questionable.

NATO members breached other important international laws as well. They clearly violated the Helsinki Accords Final Act of 1975 which guarantees the territorial inviolability of European states, and probably the 1980 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties forbidding the use of coercion and force to compel any state to sign a treaty or agreement.

Finally, the United States government circumvented its domestic law. The Clinton administration did not comply with the War Powers Act of 1973, demanding that the President submit a report to the Congress within 48 hours of US military involvement abroad, and that the President terminate such involvement within 60 days upon the submission of the report unless (a) the Congress declares war or enacts specific authorization for such use of US Armed Forces, (b) extends by law such a sixty-day period, or (c) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. The US legislature has questioned the Clinton administration regarding this probable breach of American law and the very US Constitution, which states that Congress, not the president, holds the power to declare war and to punish offenses against the ‘law of nations’ (Article I, Section 8). The Congress representatives have in fact been increasingly opposed to the presence of US troops in Kosovo and their attempt to cut funds for the operation sends a strong signal of dissatisfaction.

The NATO intervention is not legally justifiable by humanitarian international law, either. NATO cannot purport to be stopping genocide when no occurrence of genocide – before or during the bombing – could be proven. Furthermore, NATO cannot unilaterally invoke the Genocide Convention and authorize attacks. Only the Security Council possesses that authority.

For all the reasons above, even though the International Court of Justice did not grant Yugoslavia’s plea for a halt to the bombing on a technicality (claiming lack of jurisdiction), it hinted that NATO’s use of force was illegal.

The first question one ought to examine regards the exhaustion of diplomatic remedies. Unfortunately, even though Kosovo has been a known problem for a long time, and a volatile area for over a decade, the international community paid it little attention. The Rugova-led Albanian peaceful resistance was not used as a means to prevent a conflict and reach a settlement. All the non-governmental organizations pleading for preventive diplomacy for years were disappointed yet again. Indeed, it was not until the occurrence of the military conflict, instigated by the KLA, a terrorist insurgency group, that the world started dealing seriously with Kosovo. The Rambouillet Conference was a start of these negotiations. Unfortunately, their goal was not framed as a compromise but as a dictate by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, offering carrots to the Albanians (possible independence in three years) and sticks to the Yugoslav government (bombing). The Yugoslav government found the provision for possible independence impossible to accept. Appendix B, entitled "Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force," represented another part of the Rambouillet agreement, which they refused to accept. This appendix provided the NATO personnel with immunity, with "cost-free use of all Yugoslav airports, ports, roads, rails, and streets" – and, most importantly – with "free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY, including associated airspace and territorial waters." Since the Milosevic regime accepted an agreement allowing a de facto Kosovo autonomy but reaffirming the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, restricting a NATO-led peacekeeping force to the province of Kosovo and designating the UN as the primary administration following the bombing, one wonders whether the bombing and the subsequent ethnic cleansing of Albanians and then Serbs and other minorities could have been avoided by granting these concessions earlier. Although one can argue that negotiations could theoretically be conducted ad infinitum, in the case of Kosovo this non-violent manner of conflict resolution certainly had not been exhausted.

Many analysts are therefore led to believe that the bombing took place because the NATO credibility to implement its threats was questioned. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., dean of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, has argued that NATO should have taken advantage of the initial refusal by the KLA to sign the Rambouillet agreement to step back (Cited in The Wilson Quarterly, Autumn 1999). It is not clear why NATO did not do that, and it is difficult to believe that NATO maliciously desired to bomb Yugoslavia, pressuring the KLA to accept the agreement in order to provide them with that pretext.

Prior to NATO’s attack, 2000 fatalities were recorded for the two years of fighting between the Yugoslav forces and the KLA in Kosovo. This number included victims on both sides. One massacre of Albanians was reported, only later to be questioned by the press (numerous news reports on this issue were published in May and June 2000).

The Racak massacre allegedly took place on January 15, 1999. That day the Serbian press center reported police fighting the KLA terrorists in Racak, allowing the Associated Press to film the fighting, and a French journalist to visit the site later in the afternoon. More than 15 hours after the fighting allegedly occurred, US Ambassador Walker arrived with foreign journalists reporting that 45 Albanians had been shot or mutilated. The Serbian forensic team was forbidden from investigating the site – first by the KLA and then by the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). Five days later, the French press and television featured available evidence suggesting that the Racak "massacre" was a set up, mounted by the KLA during the night. The Los Angeles Times reported on this story on January 23, 1999, but it was generally given little attention in the US press. Similarly, the US media reported only scarcely about the KLA war crimes against Serbs in Klecka (10 people killed) and Glodjane (at least 12 people killed), and the shooting of 14 Serbian teenagers in downtown Pec, all taking place before the bombing. The European, and especially Italian press, gave these events significantly more attention (Joksimovich, 1999). Certainly, once an impartial investigation substantiates claims for any of the alleged massacres – Serb or Albanian, all responsible should answer for committed war crimes.

At the same time, even if the alleged Racak massacre of Albanians was substantiated and Albanian war crimes against Serbs disproved, this alleged massacre together with the figure of 2000 dead total (both Serbs and Albanians) during the two years of civil war still do not come close to approaching the severity of violations that would justify the use of external force.

In addition, one must reiterate that the KLA has been recognized as a terrorist organization by the United States (Gelbard, cited in Agence France-Presse, 23 February 1998) and by most of the international community, which stands fully aware that KLA funding is derived from the drug trade, human trafficking and other illegal commerce. Importantly, the US intelligence community warned the Clinton administration that the KLA acted deliberately to provoke harsh Serbian reprisals in an attempt to draw the United States and NATO into the conflict (Gellman, cited in Carpenter, 2000). Since both the KLA and the Yugoslav forces disrespected the laws of war, one cannot morally justify a decision to punish only one of the sides for such acts.

A final factor to be examined is the so-called "horseshoe plan" of premeditated ethnic cleansing allegedly planned by the Yugoslav government. In mid-April 1999, the German government revealed this information as a justification for the bombing, and NATO supported the claim (Solana, 1999). The allegation has been widely questioned. For instance, Jan Oberg from the Swedish Transnational Foundation for Freedom has created substantial doubt in the veracity of NATO’s "horseshoe" claim:

The primary NATO evidence for the "horseshoe operation" is the Yugoslav army buildup on the border between Central Serbia and the province of Kosovo. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav forces also gathered on the border with Macedonia, all in a very logical response to a NATO buildup led by 12,000 British, French, and German troops (AFP, 1999). Several days before the bombing, National Public Radio assured its listeners that NATO was committed to implementing its threat and that planes were gathering in Aviano, Italy. The Yugoslav military strategists were certainly also aware of that.

Most recently, the retired German Brig. Gen. Heinz Loquai, who represented Germany at OSCE during the Kosovo war, asserted that Operation Horseshoe "was fabricated by the German Defense Ministry" (Cited in Haymes, 2000). Loquai’s declaration initiated yet another European parliamentary inquiry concerning the truth of NATO governments’ statements related to the bombing.

At the onset of the NATO bombing of FR Yugoslavia, the conflict escalated in Kosovo. As the KLA continued its attacks on the Yugoslav police and the civilians, the Yugoslav forces undertook an intensified counterinsurgency operation, also targeting indiscriminately. Without any international observers on the ground and a chaotic situation created by the bombing, the extremist elements thrived, leading to the killings of thousands of people. 2,108 bodies have been exhumed thus far, and a total of 2,500 to 10,000 dead are expected to be found, with forensic teams making the more conservative estimates and NATO governments the more liberal ones.

For instance, a Spanish pathologist, Emilio Perez Pujol stated, "I calculate that the final figure of dead in Kosovo will be 2,500 at most. That includes a lot of strange deaths that cannot be blamed on anyone in particular" (Cited in Lucier and O’Meara, 1999). Mr. Pujol arrived at this conclusion after carrying out 97 autopsies in the assigned sector where there were expected to be 2,000 bodies found. In fact, even though many of the sites have not yet been examined, the priority was given to sites believed to contain the most bodies. Most "mass grave" reports proved unsubstantiated as famous satellite NATO pictures of alleged sites turned out to be simply freshly plowed fields. Other "reported sites" were either found empty or containing only five bodies. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Republic of Yugoslavia released a report in October of last year confirming that no bodies were found in the Trepca mines which were originally reported to contain bodies of 700 murdered Albanians.

While it is assumed that most of the dead are Albanian, the ethnic composition of the discovered bodies has not been revealed. The number of the KLA fighters among the Albanian victims and the number of people killed in regular fighting or by bombs is also not known because the international forensic teams refuse to provide that information.

Nevertheless, even if the final investigation finds three or five thousand people to have been victims of Yugoslav ethnic cleansing during the NATO bombing, this number stands in sharp contrast to the one provided by the US State Department at the time of the campaign – "500,000 ethnic Albanians missing and feared dead in Kosovo." The Clinton administration lowered this number with time, but continued to purport the existence of genocide. At the end of April 1999, Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen thus claimed that the Serbs were "perpetrating genocide, killing as many as 100,000 Albanians" and immediately after the bombing this figure came down to 10,000. On 5 November 1999, the Wall Street Journal reported in a paragraph on its front page that an unnamed American in the region had confirmed the estimate of 2,500 killed, calling the earlier figures ‘a disinformation campaign.’ Some media analysts have already searched for such proof. Reed Irvine, Chairman of Accuracy in Media, for instance "found a source at the State Department who admitted that their best estimate actually was only 5,000" during the bombing (Irvine, 1999). Irvine then logically questioned how the US government could have produced any estimates with such confidence when there was no objective verifier on the ground. The British press criticized its government even more openly, accusing the Blair administration of misleading the public about the scale of deaths among Kosovo civilians to justify the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (London Sunday Times, 31 October1999). If the NATO governments’ deception has indeed been conscious, it will become even harder to convince the public opinion in the future regarding the legitimacy of the humanitarian interventions or the very motives of the intervening governments.

Finally, one must remember that NATO changed its goals one week into the bombing. The original goal was to force the Milosevic regime to sign the Rambouillet agreement. The subsequent goal became to get the refugees home – the refugees that started fleeing Kosovo two days after the bombing started, chased out by the Yugoslav army or by the NATO bombs. These refugees often provided false genocide stories that were later disproved. Unlike many legitimate refugees,

Genocide fortunately did not occur in Kosovo during the bombing because in that case all the refugees would have been dead. Ethnic cleansing did occur, and even though it did not take place on the massive scale propagated by NATO governments and most Western press, all perpetrators should be brought to justice. Finally, since we do not know whether the campaign of ethnic cleansing would have occurred if the bombing had not started, the intervention is not retroactively justified by its occurrence.

At the end of the Kosovo "intervention," NATO claimed that it had destroyed 120 tanks, 220 armored personnel carriers and 450 artillery pieces in 744 "confirmed" air strikes. In Washington, Secretary of Defense William Cohen said these attacks had "severely crippled [Serbian] military forces in Kosovo by destroying more than 50 percent of [their] artillery and one-third of the armored vehicles." The reality, according to the new air force report, is that NATO destroyed 14 tanks, 18 armored personnel carriers and 20 artillery pieces – more or less what the Serbian government said at the time, which was dismissed by NATO as Serbian "disinformation" (Dejevski, 2000 and Pfaff, 2000). The complete truth about the lack of NATO’s efficacy to destroy the Yugoslav military is now revealed, calling for an investigation of the legitimacy of NATO’s targets.

An analysis of NATO’s military strategy demonstrates that NATO began the bombing as a modest effort based on a political calculation that Milosevic would back down as soon as he realized that NATO was serious about its bombing threats. Retired British Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, speaking at an Air Force Association symposium

on Allied Force, stated;

Le Nouvel Observateur of Paris, July 1, 1999 confirmed that policymakers expected Milosevic to capitulate quickly. A different outcome resulted in a shift to a greater number of targets, many of which were civilian, almost leading to an open clash between the French and the American Air Force. Indeed, the NATO governments became increasingly reluctant to support the bombing operation as the targets appeared less and less legitimate. The Yugoslav government claims that more than 2000 civilians were killed by NATO bombs. Even if that number is substantially lower (according to the Human Rights Watch, there were 500 dead civilians), such "collateral damage" is unacceptable considering the precision-bombing techniques developed by NATO, and considering that NATO often chose targets at great risk to the civilian surroundings. Many schools and hospitals were hit in addition to the civilian infrastructure and industry. All the international press organizations protested when the Serbian Radio and Television Studios were hit while the British Prime Minister Tony Blair claimed that this was a legitimate target. Finally, all stood aghast watching the scenes of dead Albanian refugees, incinerated by NATO bombs. And the murder of civilians continues through the grave pollution of the environment, endangering the health of the Yugoslav citizens and the entire region for years to come. Shockingly, "children with chemical-singed lungs find it painful to breathe and an unusual number of women suffered miscarriages following the bombing" (Frazer, 1999).

Insufficient legitimacy of NATO targets led many to accuse NATO member countries and their leaders of war crimes. Highly respected international lawyers have filed claims with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) or with their domestic courts. Indictments list breaches of general international law and violations of laws of war such as the Geneva Convention On the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and in particular its Article 18 providing for protection of civilian hospitals, as well as the Protocol II (8 June 1977) to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, Article 14, which states:

Chief Justice Carla Del Ponte stated that the ICTFY would investigate these claims. Still, it will clearly be difficult for this court to make any indictments against NATO countries considering that they have been the greatest supporters of this Court. In the meantime, the moral condemnation has already come from respected international figures such as Mary Robinson, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

Sadly, the only lesson drawn by NATO military strategists is that since the destruction of the civilian infrastructure led to Milosevic’s surrender, the attacks should be even more vicious in the future!

(This analysis is more proof that even the NATO military believes that the suffering of Albanian refugees would not have occurred had it not been for the poorly planned NATO bombing campaign!)

The use of radioactive shells – tank-piercing depleted uranium (DU) munitions and the use of cluster bombs has also been legally challenged.

NATO is not denying the use of depleted uranium but it rejects the claims that DU produces harmful effects. Even though there is no consensus on the negative effects of depleted uranium, respected environmentalists claim that "just one DU ‘hot particle’ in the lungs is equivalent to receiving a chest X-ray every hour" for the rest of your life (Frazer, 1999).

The immense harm of cluster bombs to the civilian population nevertheless cannot be hidden. Unexploded cluster bombs continue to kill and maim dozens of victims today in Kosovo. According to the World Health Organization, in the first four weeks after the bombing ended, "about 150 Kosovars were killed or injured by ‘land mines and unexploded ordnance," including bomblets (US dropped more than 200,000 and Britain dropped several thousand of these). Many cluster bombs were also dropped in the Adriatic, which is why commercial fishing has been banned from Ancona to Trieste in Italy until the end of the summer and tourists are not expected. Some Italian fishermen have already become victims of cluster bombs.

During the bombing, one horrific incident reminded many of the marketplace bombings in Sarajevo. Cluster bombs went astray above the city of Nis, killing 15 civilians and wounding 70 in a market place. Despite a strong movement against the use of cluster bombs, the military insists on using them because they are inexpensive.

In conclusion, even if the use of depleted uranium and cluster bombs has not yet been banned by law, the indiscriminate grave injuries to the civilians caused by their use stand as a convincing witness of their immorality.

A conversion of just war criteria developed by Robert Holmes, James Childress (1978) Bryan Hehir and Stanley Hoffman (1981) will be used as a test for the justification of the Kosovo military intervention:

1. Just cause: War is permissible only to confront a real and certain danger – to protect innocent life, to preserve conditions necessary for decent human existence, and to secure basic human rights.

• In Kosovo, the extent of human rights violations was not massive and widespread before the bombing.
• NATO did not stop the commission of widespread grave violations of international criminal law. "Instead, by removing the OSCE observers, NATO allowed the FRY to commence a campaign of widespread grave violations of international criminal law" (Charney, 1999). The halt of the subsequent ethnic cleansing by the Yugoslav forces cannot retroactively provide a justification for the intervention because its occurrence without the intervention cannot be proven. Furthermore, the ethnic cleansing by the KLA still rages on in Kosovo.

1. Competent Authority determines who is responsible for judging whether the other criteria are met. War must be declared by those with responsibility for public order, not by private groups or individuals

• NATO intervention was illegal, lacking the authorization by the Security Council of the United Nations. War was not declared.

1. Right intention - peace and justice, not revenge.

• NATO purported a right intention. A study of the Rambouillet negotiations questions this intention, but it would be rather difficult to prove that NATO desired to bomb FR Yugoslavia.

1. Last Resort: For the resort to war to be justified, all peaceful alternatives must have been exhausted. Nevertheless, this does not imply that all possible measures have to be attempted and exhausted if there is not reasonable expectation that they will be successful.

• Non-violent remedies certainly had not been exhausted by NATO, as revealed by the study of the Rambouillet negotiations.

5. Probability of Success: No irrational resort to force or hopeless resistance.

• An analysis of NATO’s military strategy reveals insufficient preparation for the intervention, and thus an irrational resort to force.

5. Proportionality and non-discrimination. The damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by the war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms. This principle of proportionality applies throughout the conduct of war as well as to the decision to begin warfare. Any loss of civilian life must be unintended, never representing a means of attaining a goal, even if that goal is just.

• Certain means used by NATO are at least morally questionable (depleted uranium and cluster bombs). Many of NATO targets appear indiscriminate and disproportionate, indicating possible war crimes on the part of NATO and certainly delegitimizing any alleged humanitarian purpose for the intervention.

Therefore, the only logical explanation that remains is that NATO intervened in Kosovo to maintain its international legitimacy. This is not a humanitarian intervention.

The consequences of the NATO intervention in Kosovo generally tend to be highly negative. The relations between the NATO countries and other great powers have deteriorated. Many Kosovo Albanians have suffered the fate of refugees and many were killed – but they are closer to independence. While publicly rejecting the independence efforts of the KLA, the NATO governments supported the policies creating a de facto independent Kosovo: the establishment of a lightly armed Kosovo protection force and an independent police force, a new currency, and special tariffs on the province’s borders. Indeed, the KLA is a clear winner of the intervention. It has not really disarmed, and its illegal trade is thriving as they await independence.

There is a strong concern, however, that the KLA may turn against the international community if it does not achieve de jure independence of Kosovo;

It is uncertain whether Kosovo will be independent, because that may create a dangerous precedent by which foreign interventions enable insurgency groups to secede, encouraging more groups to draw an international response by provoking the government to crack down on their violence. Indeed, as Stanley Hoffman (1981) affirms,

Next to the KLA, Milosevic is the other winner, becoming stronger as a consequence of the Kosovo intervention, as predicted by most political analysts.

The Kosovo non-Albanian minorities (Serbs, Roma, Gorani, Turks and others) and the moderate Albanians are the biggest losers of this war. Since the end of the bombing, which brought about the onslaught of KLA ethnic cleansing, 1,400 have been murdered and kidnapped (800 known to be dead and the rest presumed dead according to the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo) – under the very KFOR eye. About 330,000 have fled their homes, with little hope of returning.

The future of Kosovo is grim as states fail to provide enough troops or funds for the peacebuilding efforts (Haymes, 2000). Germany has been pressing the alliance to get out of Kosovo and partition it between North and South, which is a final proof of a lack of humanitarian concern for the people of Kosovo. Even though NATO leaders still refuse to officially acknowledge the failure of their "action" in Kosovo, they recognize their failure in practice by not hailing Kosovo as a model for future "humanitarian interventions."

International legal scholars see scant legal backing for the NATO action beyond the unwritten principle of "humanitarian intervention" that permits nations to violate the sanctity of sovereign borders in order to halt widespread human rights abuses. Nevertheless, if this principle is to become a legal rule, the present UN Charter either has to be amended or states have to come to a consensus regarding a different interpretation of the existing UN Charter to support humanitarian interventions in certain cases. Otherwise the UN Charter, as the primary source of public international law superceding all other sources, overrides the existence of any such principle.

The evolution of international law in this direction can only come about if the state practice demonstrates the practical occurrence of such evolution. The past "humanitarian interventions" constitute insufficient proof. In fact, the examples of Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Chile, Grenada, Sudan, Afghanistan, Panama, as well as the recent bombings of Iraq seriously question the humanitarian purposes of intervening countries, and the example of Rwanda is a shocking witness of great power indifference to a true humanitarian catastrophe. Furthermore, the great powers will never intervene against their Allies or other great powers as illustrated by the cases of Turkey and Czechnya. Instead, Russian President Putin was greeted royally by the greatest hawk of the Kosovo bombing, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and the United States continues to export arms to Turkey and praise its development towards democracy. Immediately after the Kosovo intervention, in August 1999, 524 people were killed in a bombing raid in Sudan and nobody proposed another humanitarian intervention.

If states do arrive at a consensus regarding humanitarian interventions, the law has to be clearly formulated in order to avoid its abuses for disguised non-humanitarian purposes. Professor Jonathan Charney (November 1999) suggests that the International Criminal Court definition of grave war crimes be used for establishing jus ad bellum once all other remedies are exhausted (diplomatic means and UN Security Council resolution attempted). If the UN forum has been exhausted, regional organizations ought to (a) warn the target state, (b) consent to ICJ jurisdiction, (c) use limited targets, minimize collateral damage, avoid unrelated effects on the target state’s legitimate functions, and observe all other requirements of international humanitarian law; (d) withdraw once securing objectives unless the target state consents to their remaining or the Security Council authorizes such presence (Charney, November 1999). Other legal scholars suggested additional formulae, such as reforming the UN structure so that a humanitarian intervention could be authorized by a two-thirds majority of the Security Council and without a possibility of a veto by the five permanent members (Christiansen, August 1999), or giving the necessary military and logistical resources to the UN to create special forces trained for humanitarian interventions.

An abundance of legal solutions indicates that creating a legal rule permitting and defining humanitarian interventions is not impossible. It appears that only the political will is lacking, with more powerful states wishing to reserve the right to intervene on a case-by-case "selective consciousness" basis, and to escape the "universal justice" of the international courts. The lack of political will is evident even from the "generous" Clinton doctrine, proclaiming that the United States will forcefully intervene to prevent human rights abuses – when it can do so. Unfortunately that authorization does not refer to the probability of a mission’s success, but to American public opinion, which has become even more distrustful of humanitarian interventions after Kosovo.